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TESTING THE OVER- AND UNDER-EXPLOITATION HYPOTHESES: 
BESTSELLING MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS (1913-32) AND THEIR USE IN 
CINEMA (1968-2007) 
 
 
Paul J. Heald* 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Some economists assert that as valuable works transition from 
copyrighted status and fall into the public domain they will be 
underexploited and their value dissipated. Others insist instead that 
without an owner to control their use, valuable public domain works 
will be overexploited or otherwise debased. This study of the most 
valuable musical compositions from 1913-32 demonstrates that 
neither hypothesis is true as it applies to the exploitation of songs in 
movies from 1968-2007. When compositions fall into the public 
domain, they are just as likely to be exploited in movies, suggesting 
no under-exploitation. And the rate of exploitation of these public 
domain songs is no greater than that of copyrighted songs, 
indicating no congestion externality. The absence of market failure 
is likely due to producer and consumer self-regulation. 
 
 
 A growing group of commentators assert that the public may suffer when valuable 
copyrighted works fall into the public domain. One concern is under-exploitation, the 
possibility that a work without an owner will not be adequately distributed or otherwise 
made available to the public. According to Landes and Posner, “[A]n absence of 
copyright protection for intangible works may lead to inefficiencies because . . . of 
impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting these works.”1 Congress,2 the 
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courts,3 and the Copyright Office4 all cited this concern in support of recent copyright 
term extension legislation.5 As to popular novels, at least, worries of under-exploitation 
appear to be unfounded. A recent empirical study of bestselling fiction from 1913-32 
demonstrates that from 1988-2001, famous public domain novels were as available as 
their copyrighted counterparts.6 
 A different, and until now empirically untested, claim asserts that a popular work 
falling into the public domain may be overexploited, “overgrazed” to use the terminology 
found in the tragedy-of-the-commons literature.7 Landes and Posner assert that the value 
of “a novel or a movie or a comic book character or a piece of music or a painting” could 
be depleted in much the same way as “unlimited drilling from a common pool of oil or 
gas would deplete the pool prematurely.”8 Others suggest that the value of ownerless 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 471, 475 (2003). 
2 Congress found in 1998 that retroactive extension of protection to existing works 
nonetheless “would provide copyright owners generally with the incentive to restore older works 
and further disseminate them to the public.” H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, p. 4 (1998). 
3 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2002) (Congress “rationally credited projections 
that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public 
distribution of their works”); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.2d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d as Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (arguing that works falling into the public domain will be less 
available to the public). 
4 See Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on HR 
989, HR 1248 and HR 1734 before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1st Sess 50, 161, 171, 188 (statement of Marybeth 
Peters, Register of Copyrights) (arguing that publishers will not risk investing in a work that they 
do not own and therefore term extension is needed to assure availability of works). 
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
6 See Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works: 
An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Best Sellers, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 1031 (2008). (comparing 166 public domain best sellers from 1913-22 with 167 
copyrighted best sellers from 1923-32 and also comparing the twenty most enduringly popular 
works from each group). 
7 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (arguing 
that real property that lacks an owner will be overused and its value degraded). 
8 Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 487. 
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works could be dissipated through excessive or inappropriate uses.9 In response, Mark 
Lemley has argued that “this justification for intellectual property depends on proof that 
there is in fact a tragedy of the commons for information.”10 Since proponents of the 
under- and over-exploitation theories have done little testing of their hypotheses, the 
present study fills a significant gap in the literature. 
Lemley identifies both the under-exploitation and the overexploitation arguments 
as “ex post” justifications for protecting works in that they provide a rationale for 
extending protection without reference to “ex ante” incentives to create.11 The ex post 
justifications outlined above stand in the forefront of the world-wide debate over whether 
copyright terms for existing works should be retroactively extended.12 Because the 
standard incentive-to-create rationale cannot justify extending the term of protection for a 
                                                 
9 See Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on 
Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Reg. Studies 2 (Jan. 2004) (noting “the possibility of network effects in the market for derivative 
works that might make a copyright commons uneconomic”); Lee Ann Fennell, Common Interest 
Tragedies, 98 Nw. L. Rev. 907, 918 (2004) (“Intellectual goods exhibit “nonrivalry” in 
consumption, insofar as the transmission of a song or theory from me to you does not leave any 
less of the song or theory for me. Nevertheless, these goods are subject to a form of overgrazing, 
insofar as consumers have limited attention.”); Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 
Ind. L. J. 919 (2003) (“In addition to encouraging authors to create new works, copyrights also 
encourage authors to efficiently utilize constituents of works that already exist. For example, if no 
one had a property right in the character Superman, authors could freely create works in which 
Superman appeared as a character without concern for the effect their works had on the value of 
actual and potential Superman-based works.”); Alex Kozinski, Mickey and Me, 11 U. MIAMI 
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465 (1994) (unauthorized uses “end[ ] up diminishing the value of the 
product, not just to the creator, but to the general public”). Cf. Justin Hughes, "Recoding” 
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923, 926 (1999) (“non-
owners commonly benefit from owner control that is used to keep a cultural object ‘stable.’”). 
10 Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004). 
11 See id. at 129-31. 
12 See, for example, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/gowers_review_intellectual_property/gowersreview_index.
cfm (study commissioned by the British Treasury department rejecting ex post justifications for 
extending copyright protection for existing works). Japan is also considering retroactive term 
extension. See http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/11/japan-looks-at-copyright-term-exten-
sion. html. The author recently presented his findings on the exploitation of bestselling public 
domain fiction in Tokyo. See http://www.21coe-win-cls.org/english/info/index.html 
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work that already exists,13 ex post justifications are also likely to drive the debate over 
further extensions in the U.S. when the present 20-year extension runs out in 2018. 
Claims of inefficient exploitation of public domain works have already been relied upon 
heavily by the successful apologists for the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act.14 
Neither the over- nor under-exploitation theories have gone unchallenged. Lemley 
scoffs at under-exploitation worries, stating that the claim “that control by a single firm is 
necessary to induce efficient production [is] theoretically unsound”15 and wondering why 
there is “some greater need to subsidize [by granting exclusive rights] the making of 
more copies of Ulysses than the making of more paper clips.”16 Amicus briefs,17 
including one signed by five Nobel Laureate economists,18 rejected the under-
exploitation argument when it was made in Eldred v. Ashcroft, and my own empirical 
work concludes that popular books falling into the public domain are not underexploited 
in comparison to their copyrighted counterparts.19 The over-exploitation theory has also 
come under attack.20 Richard Epstein is a doubter, suggesting that “[a]nyone is hard 
pressed to believe that Shakespeare's star has been dimmed by the calamities committed 
                                                 
13 See Lemley, supra note 10, at 133-34 (“Congress could obviously not justify 
retroactive extension on the ground that it would encourage dead people to produce more 
works.”); Heald, supra note 6, at 1032. 
14 See supra notes 1-4. 
15 See Lemley, supra note 10, at 138. 
16 Id. at 136. 
17 See, for example, Brief of Amici Curiae The Internet Archive, Prelinger Archives, and 
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 
01-618 (S Ct filed May, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1059714) (showing that in 
2002 more of the total number of books published in 1920 were in print than those published in 
1930). 
18 See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners, Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (S Ct filed May, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1041846). 
19 See Heald, supra note 6. 
20 See Laura Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research to Expand the 
Fair Use Exception in Copyright Law, 46 B.C.L. Rev. 706, 707 (2005) (“Academic critiques of 
using an overgrazing doctrine for intellectual property are widespread.”). 
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in his name . . .”21 So too Lemley and Dennis Karjala, both of whom deploy market-
based economic arguments to allay fears of a congestion externality caused by overuse of 
copyrighted works.22 They conclude that “a belief that the original creator (or his 
transferee) can best manage the work in the public interest runs strongly contrary to our 
long-standing and fundamental reliance on free markets to allocate resources to the 
production and distribution of goods.”23 
Although the theoretical arguments on both sides are interesting, commentators 
have so far assumed (but not necessarily believed) that works falling into the public 
domain will be exploited at a different rate than their copyrighted counterparts. 
Exploitation rates are, of course, observable and ripe for empirical analysis. In Part I of 
the article, I explain the methodology of my study of popular musical compositions from 
1913-32 as they appear in movies from 1968-2007. The study tracks songs from 1913-22 
as they fall into the public domain and compares changes in exploitation rates with songs 
from 1923-32 that are still protected by copyright. 
Studying musical compositions has several advantages over my prior study of 
best-selling books. First, tracking the appearance of compositions in movies provides 
data on the exploitation of derivative works.24 Musical compositions usually appear in 
movies as works realized by someone other than the copyright owner. In a movie we hear 
                                                 
21 Richard Epstein, Liberty v. Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 26 (2005). 
22 See Lemley, supra note 10; Dennis Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended 
Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L. J. 1065 (2006). 
23 See Karjala, supra note 22, at 1079, citing Lemley, supra note 10 at ___. 
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 100 (defining a derivative work as one “based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted.”); 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (authors’ rights include the exclusive right 
to prepare derivative works). 
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a recording of the composition, a derivative work under the Copyright Act.25 Since those 
worried about over-exploitation inevitably warn against unauthorized derivative works as 
their most serious potential concern,26 the study provides especially relevant data. 
Second, relying on the appearance of musical compositions in movies provides an 
alternative, and possibly superior, measure of availability than the counting of book 
editions and book publishers in my prior study.27 Therefore, the present study’s finding of 
no under-exploitation is not merely duplicative. 
In Part II, the results of the study are reported: Public domain songs are exploited 
at statistically the same rate as copyrighted songs, indicating that in this context worries 
of both over- and under-exploitation are misplaced. Part III joins the theoretical debate 
and suggests why self-regulation by both producers and consumers of copyrighted works 
explains the lack of market failure. Two novel tests are offered to predict unusual cases 
when over- or under-exploitation might be legitimate concerns. 
 
I. METHODOLOGY 
 
 Previous studies confirm that most copyrighted works do not hold their value over 
time. Landes and Posner note that “fewer than 11 percent of the copyrights registered 
between 1883 and 1964 were renewed at the end of their 28-year term, even though the 
cost of renewal was small.”28 They point out that of 10,027 books published in the U.S. in 
                                                 
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
26 All of the sources listed in footnote nine rely primarily on concerns over the creation of 
unauthorized derivative works. 
27 The study measured availability of public domain books listed in Books In Print and 
tracked the number of editions and publishers. These figures were used as proxy for more direct 
measures, such as sales figures (which are usually proprietary) or a nationwide survey of 
availability in book stores. See Heald, supra note 6, at 1040. 
28 Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 473. 
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1930, only 1.7 percent remained in print in 2001.29 An amicus brief in Eldred v. Ashcroft 
put the figure for books published in 1930 even lower, at 1.3 percent.30 Even those 
worried about what happens when works fall into the public domain agree that there is 
little reason to extend copyright protection to works with no current value.31 In fact, 
extending copyright for those works would entail significant tracing and transaction costs 
and would almost certainly be inefficient.32 Given this consensus, the present study 
identified the 1294 most popular musical compositions from 1913-32 and focuses on the 
74 most enduringly valuable of those compositions as they appeared in movies from 
1968-2007. The years 1968-2007 were chosen because the compositions from 1913-22 
began to fall into the public domain in 1988, the mid-point in that timeline. 
 Compositions from 1913-1932 were chosen because the works published from 
1913-22 are all in the public domain and properly renewed works published from 1923-
1932 are all still protected by copyright as a result of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension 
Act,33 allowing for a basically symmetrical comparison of ten years’ worth of works from 
each group. Until extension, the effective copyright term for these works was 75 years, so 
works from 1913 fell into the public domain in 1988, works from 1914 in fell into the 
public domain in 1989, and so on until the 1998 legislation ended the flow of works into 
the public domain.34 
                                                 
29 See id. at 474. 
30 See Brief of Amici Curiae The Internet Archive, Prelinger Archives, and Project 
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, 
n. 10 (S Ct filed May 2002) (Available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1059714) (reporting 180 books 
out of 13,470 published in 1930 were “currently available for sale.”). 
31 See Landes and Poster, supra note 1, at 474. 
32 See id. at 478-480. 
33 See 17 U.S.C. § 301. The extension only applied to works that had been properly 
renewed in their 28 year after publication under the 1909 Act. 
34 See Julie Cohen, et al, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 
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Studying a group of works from approximately the same era provides the 
opportunity to compare what happened to works from 1913-22 after they fell into the 
public domain and to compare rates of exploitation with those works from 1923-32 that 
remained protected. The initial data set included 601 of the most popular compositions 
from 1913-22 and 693 of the most popular compositions from 1923-32, as listed in the 
most accepted compilation of popular historical musical compositions.35 All of these 
songs were then tracked in the Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com) movie 
soundtrack database, which contains comprehensive information on almost 380,000 
movies.36 Since the present debate revolves around only those works that have substantial 
present value, the primary statistical analysis was performed on the 74 musical 
compositions that appeared in at least four movies from 1968-2007 (although the findings 
hold for the entire population of compositions37). Since current sales data or licensing 
information of historic compositions is mostly proprietary and unavailable, appearance in 
movies serves as a proxy for present popularity. Movie producers invest significant 
resources into choosing music for their soundtracks. Their goal is to please audiences. 
Observing their choices provides an objective and neutral indication of what historic 
music presently has value to consumers. 
 The full list of 1294 songs can be obtained from the author; the subset of 74 
appears in Appendix A. A substantial majority of the compositions (44 out of 70) were 
published in the six-year period from 1926-31, indicating the significance of the golden 
                                                                                                                                                 
153-56 (2006). 
35 See Julius Mattfield, VARIETY MUSIC CAVALCADE: 1620-1961, A 
CHRONOLOGY OF VOCAL AND INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC POPULAR IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1962). 
36 See http://www.imdb.com/database_statistics (listing 379,871 titles) (last visited on 
September 5, 2008). 
37 See Appendix B (providing full statistical analysis). 
 9
age of Tin Pan Alley,38 an extraordinary time period which marked the publication of 
many enduringly familiar works like “Bye Bye Blackbird,” “Blue Skies [Smiling at 
Me],” “My Blue Heaven,” “Let’s Do It [Let’s Fall in Love],” “Let’s Misbehave,” “When 
You’re Smiling [The Whole World Smiles with You],” “Bolero,” “Happy Days Are Here 
Again,” “Singin’ in the Rain,” “Stardust,” “Embraceable You,” “Georgia on My Mind,” 
“Get Happy,” “I’ve Got Rythym,” “Just a Gigolo,” and “Mood Indigo.”39 During this 
time, Cole Porter, the Gershwin Brothers, Harold Arlen, Hoagy Carmichael, Duke 
Ellington, and many others were at the prime of their famous composing careers. Since 
only 15 of the compositions dated from the 1913-22 time period, four qualifying songs 
from 1909-12 augment that portion of the data.40   
The public domain songs were tracked during the period they were protected by 
copyright law and then after they fell into the public domain, 75 years after publication. 
For example, “Danny Boy,”41 was first published in 1913 and entered the public domain 
in 1988. So, its use in movies from 1968 through 1987 (twenty years) when it was 
protected by copyright was tracked separately from its use in movies from 1988 through 
                                                 
38 See Phillip Furia, THE POETS OF TIN PAN ALLEY: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S 
GREAT LYRICISTS (1990); David A. Jasen, TIN PAN ALLEY: THE COMPOSERS, THE 
SONGS, THE PERFORMERS AND THEIR TIMES (1988). 
39 Mort Dixon and Ray Henderson, Bye Bye Blackbird (1926); Irving Berlin, Blue Skies 
(1927); George Whiting and Walter Donaldson, My Blue Heaven (1927); Cole Porter, Let’s Do It 
(1928); Cole Porter, Let’s Misbehave (1928); Mark Fisher, Joe Goodwin, and Larry Shay, When 
You’re Smiling (1928); Maurice Ravel, Bolero (1929); Jack Yellen and Milton Ager, Happy Days 
Are Here Again (1929); Arthur Reed and Nacio H. Brown, Singin’ in the Rain (1929); Mitchell 
Parrish and Hoagy Carmichael, Stardust (1929); Ira Gershwin and George Gershwin, 
Embraceable You (1930); Stuart Gorrell and Hoagy Carmichael, Georgia on My Mind (1930); 
Ted Kohler and Harold Arlen, Get Happy (1930); Ira Gershwin and George Gershwin, I’ve Got 
Rythym (1930); Irving Caesar and Leonello Casucci, Just a Gigolo (1930); and Duke Ellington, 
Irving Mills, and Albany Bigard, Mood Indigo (1931). 
40 Those that appeared in at least four movies from 1968-2007. They are: By the Light of 
the Silvery Moon (1909); Let Me Call You Sweetheart (1910); Alexander’s Ragtime Band (1911); 
and It’s a Long Way to Tipperary (1912). 
41 Fredrick Weatherly, Danny Boy (1915). See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Danny_ 
Boy. 
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2007 (twenty years) when it was in the public domain. Compositions from 1914 were 
therefore tracked from 1968-1988 (twenty-one years) and then from 1989-2007 (nineteen 
years), and so on. 
In order to make the graphic comparison seen in Figure 1, each year’s worth of 
compositions from the public domain song set were matched with the corresponding year 
a decade later in the copyrighted song set. Compositions from 1913 were paired with 
1923, 1914 were paired with 1924, and so on. For example, three songs from 1913 
appeared in a total of four movies from 1968-1987 (a rate of 4/60), before the songs fell 
into the public domain. Those same three songs appeared in 20 movies from 1988-2007 
(a rate of 20/60).42 Therefore, the single song in the data set of copyrighted songs from 
1923 was also measured in the same time frame, counting its use in movies from 1968-
1987 (denominated “period one”) and then from 1988-2007 (denominated “period two”). 
The song, “Bugle Call Rag,” appeared in no movies from 1968-87 (a rate of 0/20) and in 
four movies from 1988-2007 (rate of 4/20). For songs from 1914 and 1923, the relevant 
time periods for measuring uses in movies was 1968-1988 (period one) and 1989-2007 
(period two); for songs from 1915 and 1925, from 1968-89 (period one) and 1990-2007 
(period two), and so on. 
The aggregate number of uses in movies of the 1913-22 songs during the period 
they were still under copyright was compared to the aggregate number of uses of the 
1923-32 songs in time period one. Then, the aggregate number of uses in movies of the 
1913-22 songs after they fell into the public domain was compared with the aggregate 
number of uses of the 1923-32 songs in time period two. This comparison allows for a 
                                                 
42 The rate is 4/60 and 20/60 rather than 4/20 and 20/20 because each of the three songs 
was measured during a twenty-year time period, a total of sixty measurable song years (three 
songs x twenty years = sixty song years). 
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straightforward explanation of the formal statistical regressions presented in Appendix B 
which employ a more robust, but less narratively engaging, methodology. 
 
II. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 The goal of the analysis was to answer two questions. First, when compositions 
from 1913-22 fell into the public domain were they exploited at a significantly different 
rate than while they were still protected by copyright? Second, if the rate of exploitation 
of public domain works increased after they fell into the public domain, did the change 
indicate signs of over-exploitation in comparison to the rate of exploitation? 
A. No Evidence of Under-Exploitation 
 Before the compositions from 1913-22 fell into the public domain, they appeared 
in movies on average at a rate of once every 15.3 years. After they fell into the public 
domain, they appeared in movies on average at a rate of once every 3.8 years. At first 
glance, this rate change appears to show a significant increase in exploitation, but the rate 
change must be compared to the rate of uses of copyrighted songs during the same time 
period. After all, all songs from this general era, regardless of their legal status, may be 
appearing more frequently in recent movies. This, in fact, appears to be the case. During 
the same comparative time periods, the rate at which copyrighted songs from 1923-32 
appear in movies increased from once every 7.8 years in time period one to once every 
3.3 years in time period two. The following graph shows the comparative increase in 
terms of average yearly use of a song in a movie, an increase for public domain songs 
from .065 uses per year to .263 uses per year and an increase for copyrighted songs of 
from .128 uses per year to .304. 
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Figure 1 
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 Since the songs from 1913-22 fell into the public domain, they have been used on 
average four times more frequently in movies. The songs from 1923-32 also appear more 
frequently in movies over the same time period. The change, however, is more modest, 
an increase of a little less than two and one-half times as frequently. The formal statistical 
regressions in Appendix B, not surprisingly, demonstrate that the transition from 
protected work to unprotected work did not render public domain compositions under-
exploited in relation to works that remained protected by copyright. Public domain songs 
from this era do not become orphans that are unavailable for public consumption. 
 13
 This result is generally consistent with my prior study of bestselling fiction from 
the same period.43 That research compared the 166 bestselling novels from 1913-22 with 
the 167 bestselling novels from 1923-32 and found that from 1988-2001, novels in the 
public domain were in print at a rate insignificantly different from novels still under 
copyright.44 After 2001, however, the public domain novels were in print at a 
significantly higher rate, with significantly more editions per novel.45 In 2006, the in-
print rate for the public domain novels was 98% as compared to 74% for the copyrighted 
novels.46 A comparison of the sub-sets of the twenty most enduringly popular novels 
generated similar results.47 
 Although the music composition data show no evidence of under-exploitation, the 
study does not prove a positive public domain effect on availability, like that 
demonstrated for public domain books after 2001. A superficial comparison of the rate 
changes for music exploitation looks significant (4x as compared to 2.5x), but the logistic 
regressions performed in Appendix B expose the confounding effect of time as a variable 
and show that the comparative rates of exploitation of public domain and copyrighted 
music are not significantly different.  
Why is there a positive public domain effect with books, but not with musical 
compositions as they appear in film? One difference may be that the study of best-selling 
fiction measured the availability of copies of an original work. The costs of scanning a 
book into a computer, printing it, and selling it are quite low; many Dover versions of 
                                                 
43 See Heald, supra note 6, at 1040-43. 
44 Id. at 1040. 
45 Id. at 1041. 
46 Id. at 1040. 
47 Id. at 1044-45. 
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bestselling classics sell for less than four dollars.48 If one chooses to publish a 
copyrighted book instead of a public domain book, the additional licensing cost will have 
a significant effect on the overall cost of production. On the other hand, the proportional 
cost savings of choosing a public domain song for a movie is likely to be much lower. 
Because a musical composition, whether it is protected by copyright or not, can only 
appear in a movie as a derivative work, the director of the film must either hire musicians 
or singers (or both) in order to realize a version of the composition, or she must obtain a 
license to use an existing recording of the composition. Creating the derivative work from 
“scratch” will likely entail significant costs, and the alternative of using an existing 
recording will likely entail the payment of a significant licensing fee to the owner of the 
recording. These costs will be incurred even if the underlying musical composition is in 
the public domain.49 
 Using a musical composition in a movie, therefore, is likely to be significantly 
more expensive than copying a book because it entails the creation of a new derivative 
work or the purchasing of a license to use one created by someone else. A film director 
can save some money by telling her musical director to choose only public domain 
compositions for the score, but the savings will be proportionally smaller than those 
enjoyed by the book publisher. Because of the marginal savings of choosing public 
domain music, it is not surprising that compositions are not exploited at a rate 
significantly exceeding that of protected music.50 
                                                 
48 See amazon.com (advanced book search under “publisher/Dover” and 
“subject/literature and fiction”). 
49 Sound recordings of public domain compositions are independently protectable under 
17 U.S.C. 106(7). Compare 106(2) (establishing separate protection for musical compositions). 
50 They are exploited at a higher rate, but the difference is not significant. See Appendix 
B. 
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B. No Evidence of Over-Exploitation 
 Two sorts of over-exploitation arguments have been offered by those who worry 
about what happens to works when they fall into the public domain. First, works may 
simply be overused and worn out, like a song we have heard so frequently we do not 
want to hear it again. Second, inappropriate uses, even if infrequent, may “recode” the 
original meaning of a work,51 debase it or otherwise make it less valuable to consumers. 
The examples most frequently given involve uses of copyrighted fictional characters in 
new pornographic works.52 
 1. No Evidence of Worn-Out Songs 
As noted earlier each song in the public domain data set on average appears in a 
movie once every 3.8 years; each song in the copyrighted data set on average appears in a 
movie once every 3.3 years. Appendix B shows that these rates are statistically the same. 
This result makes it very difficult to argue that these songs need owners in order to 
prevent them from being worn out and devalued. If copyright owners are willing to 
license their compositions at a higher rate than public domain compositions are used, then 
the evidence against over-exploitation seems conclusive. 
Even the most intense periods of usage of the public domain songs, Danny Boy 
(1913), with nine movie appearances between 1993 and 2001 and After You’ve Gone 
(1918), with nine movie appearances between 1996 and 2006, do not outstrip the periods 
of most intense usage for compositions protected by copyright. For example, in the 
1930’s, Sweet Georgia Brown (1925) appeared in 15 movies, Am I Blue? (1929) in 17 
movies, and Happy Days Are Here Again (1929) in 34 movies. More recently, the Irving 
                                                 
51 See Hughes, supra note 9, at 923-26. 
52 See Liebowitz, supra note 9, at 5-6 (speculating about porno tales involving Dr. 
Seuss’s character the Grinch). 
 16
Berlin classic Blues Skies (1927) appeared in 10 movies from 1994-2004; Stardust (1929) 
appeared in 10 movies in the 1990’s; and Dream a Little Dream of Me (1931) appeared in 
10 movies from 1995-2005. Copyright owners seem to be willing to license their 
compositions at rates equal to or exceeding that of the most intensely used public domain 
compositions. When a song falls into the public domain, the data provide no evidence 
that it will be overexploited and worn out by moviemakers. 
2. Debased Works? 
Even if a song is not subject to overly frequent use, some worry that a handful of 
“inappropriate” uses might debase the value of the original work, rendering it less 
desirable for consumption. If public domain songs have been subjected to damaging uses, 
therefore, one would expect them to be used less frequently in movies thereafter. After 
all, a rational film director would not want to alienate her audiences with a composition 
that had been previously debased. Evidence of debasement should show up in decreasing 
demand for public domain music over time as compared to copyrighted music from the 
same era. The data as a whole show no evidence of this, but the number of movie uses in 
any particular year is too small to measure accurately whether any particular public 
domain song has been damaged, damage that might be masked by its inclusion in the 
larger set of songs. 
Evidence from my previous study of bestselling fiction, however, provides some 
interesting evidence on individual works. At Year 75 after publication, the twenty most 
enduring popular works from 1913-22 were in print at an average of 4.7 editions per 
title.53 At Year 80 after publication, the average is 9 editions per title, and at year 85 it 
                                                 
53 See Appendix C (previously unpublished data). 
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rises to 13.4 editions per title.54 By the year 2006, an average of 26.6 editions per title are 
in print.55 The data demonstrate no evidence that pervasive inappropriate uses have 
reduced the attractiveness of the works for production and delivery to the public. The 
story is the same when one looks at the individual titles. Eighteen of the twenty titles 
were in print in more editions in Year 80 after publication than in Year 75.56 All twenty 
experienced an increase from Year 80 after publication to Year 85, and all twenty 
experienced an increase in the number of available editions from Year 85 after 
publication to the year 2006.57 Moreover, the steepness of the upward sloping curve of 
editions exceeds that of copyrighted works from the same era over the same periods.58 
This is not to assert, of course, that there have been no shocking uses of either the songs 
or the books studied. As discussed below, producer and consumer self-regulation may 
explain why works are likely safe from even pornographic uses. 
 
III. THE EFFICIENT EXPLOITATION DEBATE 
 
 Given the lack of empirical support, the persistence of claims that value is 
dissipated when works fall into the public domain seems curious. In this final section, I 
explore the paradigmatic examples of inefficient exploitation that have been offered and 
suggest a test to identify when problems might occur. Previous skeptics have argued that 
even if value is dissipated, we should not worry when it results from the natural 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. The exceptions are Pollyana (1913), by Eleanor Porter, which was published in 
5 editions in year 75 after publication and only 4 in year 80, and Scaramouche (1921), by 
Raphael Sabatini, which was published in 5 editions in year 75 after publication and only in 3 
editions in year 80. By 2006, Pollyana was available in 30 different editions and Scaramouche in 
18. 
57 Id. 
58 See Heald, supra note 6, at 1045, Figure 3. 
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interaction of market forces.59 I explore below why value may be unlikely to be 
dissipated at all when works fall into the public domain. 
A. Under-Exploitation 
 In my previous work, I identified three conditions that might justify extending 
copyright protection to an existing work in order to prevent its under-exploitation: 1) The 
cost of making the initial copy of a work available to the public is high; 2) the cost to free 
riders of making subsequent copies is low; and 3) the newly available work does not 
incorporate independently protectable material.60 The test had its genesis in arguments 
over whether old public domain films needed owners in order to ensure their preservation 
and distribution.61 If an old film requires a significant expenditure to repair and yet could 
easily be copied and distributed without authorization once it is in digital form, the owner 
of the physical copy of the film may lack an adequate financial incentive to restore the 
film. The above test builds on this seemingly sensible intuition about a narrow category 
of works that might require owners to ensure their availability. Given the reality 
surrounding aging films, which may be more efficiently husbanded by non-owners,62 we 
                                                 
59 See Karjala, supra note 22, at 1072 (criticizing Landes and Posner and arguing that “A 
change in the demand curve for a work, however, while showing a change in how much society 
values a particular work relative to whatever else is available, says nothing about the total value 
to society of all the goods and services available.”) Karjala notes that if the public’s taste for 
buggies shifts to cars then “[b]uggies are indeed less valuable, but society has incurred no 
economic loss.” Id. Mark Lemley notes that competition changes consumption patterns with 
durable goods and should also with creative goods formerly protected by copyright. See Lemley, 
supra note 10, at 135-6 (“Our normal supposition is that the invisible hand of the market will 
work by permitting different companies to compete with each other [to produce a good the public 
wants].”). Cf. Heald, supra note 6, at 1054 (“If we trust the market to produce the optimal amount 
of tangible goods like string, bubble gum, and diet soda without entrusting central control of 
those products to a single authority, why should we treat intangible public goods like My Antonia, 
the color yellow, or the word “coffee” any differently””). 
60 Heald, supra note 6, at 1052-53. 
61 See Lemley, supra note 10, at 134 & fn.16 (collecting sources). 
62 See id. at 137 & fn.27, citing Deirdre K. Mulligan and Jason M. Schultz, Neglecting the 
National Memory: How Copyright Term Extensions Compromise the Development of Digital 
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should add a fourth proviso: 4) owners are in fact more willing than non-owners to 
preserve and distribute. This new fourth condition finds support in a recent study 
undertaken by the Library of Congress that shows non-owners have been making historic 
sound recordings available in digital form at a higher rate than their owners.63 
Where the four conditions are met, perhaps we should be worried, but it seems 
clear that they are generally not met with respect to the vast majority of books, music, 
films or computer programs and other works that are cheap and easy to produce.64 In 
general, the copyright term seems adequate if it is long enough to stimulate the creation 
of the work in the first instance. Extra extension, like that found in the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, is probably not justified except in a tiny fraction of cases. In the absence 
of these four conditions, we should not expect to see problems with under-exploitation 
when a work falls into the public domain. 
Applying the test to musical compositions as they appear in movies helps explain 
why we see no under-exploitation with these works As noted above, a musical 
composition as it appears in a movie is a derivative work that may be quite costly for the 
music director to use and thereby make available in a new form to the public.65 Unlike 
with the making a copy of a book, the first condition arguing in favor of ownership may 
                                                                                                                                                 
Archives, 4 J APP PRAC & PROCESS 451, 472 (2002) (“According to the Internet Movie 
Database, 36,386 motion picture titles were released from 1927 to 1946. Of those, only 2,480 are 
currently available on videotape; only 871 are available on DVD; only 114 are available on Pay-
Per-View/TV; and only thirteen are available in theaters.”). Lemley notes, “By contrast, just one 
archive--the Prelinger Archive--has over 27,000 public domain films and has put more than 1,100 
online. See Rick Prelinger, Prelinger Archives, online at http:// www.prelinger.com.” Id. 
63 See Tim Brooks, Survey of Reissues of U.S. Recording, Council on Library and 
Information Resources (2004) (copyright owers have made only 14% of popular recording from 
1890-1964 available on CD, while non-owners have made 22% of them available to the public on 
CD). 
64 See Heald, supra note 6, at 1051-53. 
65 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
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often be met. Condition two is also probably met: if the movie is in a digital format, it 
will be quite easy to copy. Condition three, however, is not met, and songs in movies 
provide a nice example of the salience of that condition. A musical composition as it 
abides in a soundtrack is surrounded by independently protected work, like the script, the 
cinematography, and the sound recording itself, whose copyright is owned by its 
producer. The musical composition per se, the sheet music, cannot be easily extracted 
without offending the rights of copyright owners of neighboring works. The realization of 
the old public domain work within a new protected format means that the filmmaker has 
few real worries about competitors free riding its labor. In other words, the public domain 
status of the underlying musical composition should not pose a threat to its continued 
exploitation, precisely what the data analyzed above shows. 
B. Overexploitation: Worn Out Works and Inappropriate Uses 
 Trademark law provides a nice example of how both sorts of overexploitation 
fears discussed in Part II become operationalized in law. One of the primary bases, for 
example, for the enactment of the Federal Trademark Anti-Dilution Act66 was the fear 
that unauthorized uses of a trademark would blur its ability to identify the source of its 
owner’s goods or services. Even if a new “KODAK Café” or “EXXON Telephone” were 
of impeccable quality, Congress feared that a proliferation of uses would render marks 
like KODAK or EXXON less able to call to mind their original owners. Overuse might 
literally wear out the marks. I am currently collecting data on whether such unauthorized 
uses actually occurred prior to anti-dilution protection, but there is little doubt that the 
“wearing out” theory motivated Congress to pass the law in 1988.67 
                                                 
66 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
67 See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in 
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  On the other hand, traditional trademark infringement provides a good example 
of how inappropriate uses can directly alter, as opposed to just wear out, the meaning of a 
symbol.68 In fact, accountants routinely testify about the amount of pecuniary damage 
done to the value of a trademark when consumers are confused by an infringer.69 If a 
garment maker sells shirts under the trademark “EXCELSIOR” and establishes a 
reputation for a high quality product, a subsequent user of the trademark on inferior 
goods will not only lower the trademark’s value to the garment maker, but also make the 
word “EXCELSIOR” less usable to the public. Before the infringement, “EXCELSIOR” 
meant high quality shirts; afterwards it does not. If consumers are successfully confused 
by an infringer, then the public has been robbed of a valuable mnemonic device. The 
mark is debased. 
 Given the data presented in Part II, we need to ask why these two concerns might 
not have the same traction in the context of copyrighted works. 
 1. Worn Out Songs? Worn Out Anything? 
 As noted in Part II, each of the most popular public domain songs from 1913-22 
appears in movies at statistically the same rate. At least in the context of musical 
compositions in movies, there appears to be no chance that public domain songs are 
wearing out at a higher rate than their copyrighted counterparts. But what about songs as 
they are heard on the radio or in television advertising? Is it possible that public domain 
songs are being worn out via overexposure in non-movie media? 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 975-82 (2001). 
68 The cause of action for dilution via tarnishment of a mark’s image is designed to 
protect a mark from altered meanings. See 35 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
69See Gordon V. Smith, Trademark Valuation (1997). 
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 Landes and Posner,70 and Liebowitz and Margolis71 recognize that congestion 
externalities usually are not thought to be a problem with works, like those typically 
protected by copyright law, which have the characteristics of non-rivalrousness and 
inexhaustibility. They understand that a song can be sung by one or two or one thousand 
people at the same time (demonstrating non-rivalrousness), over and over again, day after 
day, without wearing the song out (demonstrating inexhaustibility). Since the marginal 
cost imposed by each additional user is zero, limiting access would result in a deadweight 
loss. In fact, if one defines the value of a good in terms of its continued usability, then 
overuse is theoretically impossible with pure public goods. Landes and Posner, and 
Liebowitz and Margolis, however, argue that the relevant measure of value is market 
value, not usability, and therefore posit that certain sorts of marginal additional uses of a 
public good may impose positive costs. For example, if dozens of advertisers all chose 
the same song to market their products on television, the public might tire of the tune, and 
demand for it would drop, reducing its market value. We might, they speculate, see a 
musical version of the tragedy of the commons. 
 With songs, this eventuality seems unlikely. First, the vast majority of media 
airplay occurs through the broadcaster’s acquisition of an ASCAP license. The standard 
license in no way restricts the number of times a song can be broadcast over any period 
of time.72 In other words, copyright owners, acting through their primary agent, the 
American Society of Composers and Authors and Publishers, seem utterly uninterested in 
limiting the airplay of their compositions. Broadcasters, not copyright owners, determine 
                                                 
70 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 485. 
71 Liebowitz and Margolis, supra note 9, at 5. 
72 See http://www.ascap.com/licensing/radio/RMLC_License.pdf (standard license agree-
ment for radio stations). 
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how frequently the public should hear a song. Presumably, broadcasters voluntarily 
choose not to overplay a song for fear of alienating the public or reducing the value of a 
good they would like to offer in the future. Overplaying a musical composition, whether 
it is copyrighted or in the public domain, is bad business, a fact that copyright owners 
seem to recognize by not restraining broadcasters. In the broadcasting context, public 
domain songs seem no more likely to be worn out, therefore, than copyrighted songs. It 
seems specious, at least as to broadcasting, to argue that each song needs an owner to 
limit its use. 
 That leaves “background” music used in advertising, in films, and on television 
which is not licensed through ASCAP.73 My data cast doubt on overuse of public domain 
music in movies, and over-exploitation seems unlikely in other contexts also. With a 
virtually infinite commons of music to choose from, advertisers are unlikely to risk 
alienating the public by choosing the same theme music as too many of their peers. 
Decades of watching television and listening to radio support this economic intuition.74 
The traditional tragedy of the commons analogy may be inadequate to capture the market 
for something like music in advertising.  
To illustrate the tragedy of the commons, economists tell the story of a common 
field subject to overgrazing because no owns it and therefore no one has the proper 
incentive to maximize its value. And, of course, empirical evidence shows an increase in 
                                                 
73Licenses must be negotiated directly with the copyright owner See 
http://www.harryfox.com/public/hfaPurpose.jsp (stating that the Harry Fox Agency does not 
“issue licenses for the use of music in advertising, movies, and TV programs (aka 
synchronization licensing or ‘synch’) . . .[t]o obtain a synch license, print right, or sample 
clearance, you need to contact the music publisher directly.”). 
74 Two pieces that have come to annoy me in commercials, Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue 
and the famous choral section from Orff’s Carmina Burana, are still under copyright. 
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agricultural production in England when common fields were enclosed.75 An advertising 
jingle presents a significantly different situation. Unlike the farmer who has limited 
options as to where to graze his cattle, the advertiser has thousands of songs to choose 
from. A farmer with a thousand choices of equally cheap and desirable fields on which to 
graze his cattle would rationally choose not to overgraze any particular one. It would be 
pointless and might cost him in the future. Overgrazing in the presence of numerous 
choices of fresh fields might even impose a reputational cost. So too with advertisers 
choosing music to sell their products. Advertisers have no reason to overgraze when 
musical options are plentiful, and, more importantly, when the costs associated with 
annoying the public are too high. Overuse of promotional music, as with broadcast music, 
would be a bad marketing decision that is unlikely to need regulation. 
 Outside of the context of background music, the role of consumer choice may also 
help explain any absence of overused works. Consider books, which unlike trademarks 
and sometimes songs, require an element of consumer choice in their consumption. One 
can imagine the public getting tired of encountering a ubiquitous song or getting tricked 
by a misused trademark, but it’s difficult to see how the multiplicity of editions of a book 
could make the public sick of the story. My Antonia (1918), by Willa Cather, is available 
in at least 50 different editions by at least 50 different publishers in many formats (cheap 
paperback, trade paper, hard cover, large print, curricular unit, ebook, audio tape and 
audio cd) at prices as low as $2 and as high as $108;76 yet, no consumer has to 
unwillingly encounter the story or its characters. If a consumer encounters the same song 
in the advertising for fifty products, he or she may get tired of hearing it. The song could 
                                                 
75 See Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1392 (1993). 
76See www.booksinprint.com. 
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not be avoided without turning off the television, switching off the radio, and avoiding 
places which broadcast ads, but the consumer of books will never be forced to consume 
even a single one of the fifty editions of My Antonia. It is difficult to see a work ever 
wearing out in a situation when the public only encounters it when it chooses to. 
Consumer choice/avoidance can be an effective form of non-governmental regulation 
preventing a work from wearing out. 
 In order to state general conditions where concerns of overexploitation might be 
justified, one must consider the likely private regulation by both producers of works and 
consumers of them. Consistent with the findings in this study, we should expect to find 
congestion in markets for intangible goods potentially protected by copyright only when 
three conditions exist: 1) substitutes for the good are not cheap and plentiful;  2) 
additional subsequent uses of the good entail no significant reputational or other costs to 
the producer (e.g. by alienating consumers); and 3) consumption of the good by 
consumers cannot easily be avoided by them (e.g. some advertising uses). 
 2. Debased Songs? Debased Anything? 
The data analyzed in Part II suggest that public domain musical compositions 
appear in movies with about the same frequency as one would predict that similar 
copyrighted compositions would appear. This result suggests they have not been debased 
in some way by inappropriate uses that render them no longer fit for public 
consumption.77 My earlier study of fiction is even more strongly suggestive of a lack of 
this sort of congestion. Yet, worry over inappropriate uses debasing works persists. 
As noted above, virtually every commentator who takes the possibility of 
debasement seriously points to unauthorized uses of fictional characters as his or her 
                                                 
77 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 26
prime example, rather than the making of unauthorized copies of books or songs. The 
entire debate seems to turn on the effect of having unauthorized porn movies starring 
Mickey Mouse78 or Superman.79 No commentators worried about unauthorized 
pornography seem aware of the vast amount of unauthorized “inappropriate” works that 
have already been produced. A quick search of the Internet Adult Film Database 
(www.iafd.com) reveals six pornographic movies with “Cinderella” in the title, including 
Cinderella in Chains and its two sequels, three with Snow White in the title, and a 
whopping 19 featuring Santa Claus.80 Searches on the same database of “Apollo” and 
“Zeus” turn up numerous examples of gay cinematic achievement. Unauthorized porn fan 
fiction also abounds, starring such characters as Harry Potter, Captain Kirk and Mr. 
Spock, and Starsky and Hutch.81 Is there a serious argument that Cinderella, Santa, 
mythical Greek Gods, Harry Potter, and Star Trek characters are worth less now than 
before these works were produced? 
 Probably not. Consumer and producer self-regulation likely combine to nullify the 
potential negative effects of unauthorized uses of fictional characters. Consumers who 
would be offended by a porno Mickey will not purchase a movie or read the fan fiction 
setting forth his daring new exploits. Those who deliberately seek out the new Mickey 
will do so because the porn version enhances Mickey’s value to them, rather than detracts 
from it. Movies, books, and images that must be deliberately sought out by consumers are 
unlikely to affect negatively the value of the fictional characters portrayed therein. 
 This observation suggests that the most serious problem might be posed by goods, 
                                                 
78 See Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at ___. 
79 See Green, supra note 9, at 919. 
80 See www.iafd.com (last visited, September 5, 2008). 
81 See “Slash fiction” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slash_fiction. 
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like t-shirts, which cannot be avoided by the public when the wearer strolls down the 
street. This danger is probably lessened by the natural reluctance of producers and 
distributors to sell offensive material. The GAP is unlikely to start selling a t-shirt 
portraying Mickey and Goofy in bed together. In other words, producer self-regulation, 
like consumer self-regulation, diminishes the likelihood that serious damage will be done 
to an iconic character. The internet, however, provides a venue where the reputation costs 
of selling offensive items like t-shirts may be low enough to sustain a market. If the GAP 
will not sell the offensive t-shirt, then someone on-line might. An internet purchase might 
end up being displayed on the chest of someone walking down the street. We could 
potentially encounter an image portraying Mickey and Goofy in compromising 
circumstances, despite our best efforts to avoid it. 
 The number of pedestrians wearing offensive gear, however, is likely to be quite 
low. There are reputational costs to the wearer that will deter all but a handful of people 
from displaying such goods in public. And more importantly, Disney will employ its 
lawyers to prevent the unauthorized sale of its trademarked images.82 Trademark law 
provides strong protection against unauthorized uses of franchised fictional characters. 
Not all characters function as trademarks, however, so the potential for an offensive 
Cinderella or Snow White t-shirt remains a possibility, although the author has never 
encountered one. 
 To generalize conditions from the discussion above, debasement of a work not 
protected by copyright would seem unlikely when: 1) Consumers must deliberately seek 
out and consume the good;  2) Presenting the good to the consumer entails no 
                                                 
82 See http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=df4mjh.2.22 (trademark 
registration for image of Mickey Mouse); http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/ 
showfield?f=doc&state=df4mjh.5.3 (Disney trademark registration for Goofy). 
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reputational or other costs to the producer (e.g. by alienating consumers); 3) Public 
consumption entails no reputational costs to the consumer; and 4) Consumption is lawful 
(e.g. it entails no violation of trademark law, obscenity law or libel). These four 
conditions should be met so infrequently that the burden of proving over-exploitation 
should be squarely placed on those who claim it is a serious problem worthy of 
government intervention in the market.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study of the most popular musical compositions published from 1913-32 as 
they appear in movies from 1968-2007 suggests that the film market for public domain 
music functions as efficiently as the market for copyrighted music without any special 
governmental intervention, such as retroactive copyright term extension. This confirms 
similar research conducted on the exploitation of bestselling fiction from the same era. 
These studies cannot prove that copyright protection beyond that necessary to stimulate 
the creation of a work in the first instance is never necessary, but they suggest that the 
over- and under-exploitation hypotheses are over-stated. Surely the time has come to 
place the burden of proof on those who predict valuable works in the public domain will 
suffer from serious market failure. Legislation should be based on sound empirical 
evidence.  
In the absence of concrete evidence, we are left with predicting the behavior of 
rational actors, which indicates that self-regulation by producers and consumers of public 
domain goods will discipline the market. Their likely behavior suggests four conditions 
necessary for under-exploitation and four conditions necessary for over-exploitation. 
These conditions suggest that any legislative response should be very specifically 
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targeted to a very narrow set of works. Blanket term extension to all sorts of works in all 
sorts of contexts, with its significant attendant costs, cannot be justified by a handful of 
very narrow, and unproven, hypothetical assumptions. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Year Title Composer(s) 
1909 By the Light of the Silvery Moon Edward Madden; Gus Edwards 
1910 Let Me Call You Sweetheart Beth Whitson; Leo Friedman 
1911 Alexander's Ragtime Band Irving Berlin 
1912 It's a Long Way to Tipperary Jack Judge; Harry Williams 
1913 El Choclo A.G. Villoldo; G.J.S.W. 
 Danny Boy Frederick E. Weatherly 
 You Made Me Love You--I Didn't Want to Do It Joe McCarthy; James V. Monaco 
1914 St. Louis Blues William Christopher Handy 
1915 
Pack Up Your Troubles in Your Old Kitbag and  
Smile, Smile, Smile George Asaf; Felix Powell 
1916 Colonel Bogey 
Kenneth J. Alfred (pseud. of Major F.J.  
Ricketts) 
 I Ain't Got Nobody 
Roger Graham; Spencer Williams & Dave  
Peyton 
 Poor Butterfly (The Big Show) John L. Golden; Raymond Hubbell 
1917 Over There George Michael Cohan 
1918 After You've Gone Henry Creamer & Turner Layton 
1920 Avalon Al Jolson & Vincent Rose 
 Look for the Silver Lining (Good Morning, Dearie) Bud De Sylva; Jerome Kern 
 Whispering Malvin Schonberger; John Schonberger 
1921 The Sheik of Araby (Make it Snappy) 
Harry B. Smith & Francis Wheeler; Ted 
Snyder 
1922 Hot Lips Henry Busse, Henry Lange & Lou Davis 
1923 Bugle Call Rag Jack Pettis, Billy Meyers & Elmer Schoebel 
1924 The Man I Love (Strike Up the Band) Ira Gershwin; George Gershwin 
 Tea for Two (No, No, Nanette) Irving Caesar; Vincent Youmans 
1925 Manhattan (Garrick Gaieties) Lorenz Hart; Richard Rodgers 
 Rhapsody in Blue George Gershwin 
 Show Me the Way to Go Home Irving King 
 Sweet Georgia Brown Ben Bernie, Maceo Pinkard & Kenneth Casey 
 Yes Sir, That's My Baby Gus Kahn; Walter Donaldson 
1926 Are You Lonesome Tomight? Roy Turk & Lou Handman 
 Bye Bye Blackbird Mort Dixon; Ray Henderson 
 La Cumparsita G.H. Matos Rodriquez; Vincenzo Billi 
 Someone to Watch Over Me (Oh, Kay!) Ira Gershwin; George Gershwin 
1927 The Best Things in Life Are Free (Good News) 
Bud G. De Sylva, Lew Brown & Ray 
Henderson 
 Blue Skies Irving Berlin 
 My Blue Heaven George Whiting; Walter Donaldson 
1928 I Can't Give You Anything But Love Dorothy Fields; Jimmy McHugh 
 I Wanna Be Loved By You (Good Boy) Bert Kalmar; Herbert Stothart & Harry Ruby 
 If I Had You 
Ted Shapiro, Jimmy Campbell & Reginald  
Connelly 
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 Let's Do It (Paris) Cole Porter 
 Let's Misbehave (Paris) Cole Porter 
 Makin' Whoopee! Gus Kahn; Walter Donaldson 
 Sweet Lorraine Mitchell Parish; Cliff Burwell 
 
When You're Smiling--the Whole World Smiles 
 with You Mark Fisher, Joe Goodwin & Larry Shay 
1929 Ain't Misbehavin' (Hot Chocolates) Andy Razaf; Thomas Waller & Harry Brooks 
 Am I Blue?  Grand Clarke; Harry Akst 
 Bolero Maurice Ravel 
 Happy Days Are Here Again Jack Yellen; Milton Ager 
 Honeysuckle Rose (Load of Coal) Andy Razaf; Thomas Waller  
 Singin' in the Rain Arthur Freed; Nacio Herb Brown 
 Star Dust Mitchell Parish; Hoagy Carmichael 
 
You Do Something to Me (Fifty Million 
Frenchmen) Cole Porter 
1930 Beyond the Blue Horizon 
Leo Robin; Richard Whiting & W. Franke  
Harling 
 Body and Soul (Three's a Crowd) 
Edward Heyman, Robert Sour & Frank  
Eyton; John W. Green 
 Embraceable You (Girl Crazy) Ira Gershwin; George Gershwin 
 Exactly Like You  Dorothy Fields; Jimmy McHugh 
 Georgia On My Mind Stuart Gorrell; Hoagy Carmichael 
 Get Happy Ted Koehler; Harold Arlen 
 I Got Rhythm (Girl Crazy) Ira Gershwin; George Gershwin 
 Just a Gigolo Irving Caesar; Leonello Casucci 
 Love for Sale (The New Yorkers) Cole Porter 
 My Ideal Leo Robin; Richard Whiting & Newell Chase 
 On the Sunny Side of the Street Dorothy Fields; Jimmy McHugh 
 Sleepy Lagoon Jack Lawrence; Eric Coates 
 Three Little Words Bert Kalmar; Harry Ruby 
 You Brought a New Kind of Love to Me Sammy Fain, Irving Kahal & Pierre Norman 
1931 Dancing in the Dark (The Band Wagon) Howard Dietz; Arthur Schwartz 
 Dream a Little Dream of Me Gus Kahn; W. Schwandt & F. Andree 
 
I Found a Million Dollar Baby--In a Five and Ten  
Cent Store (Billy Rose's Crazy Quilt) Billy Rose & Mort Dixon; Harry Warren 
 Life is Just a Bowl of Cherries Lew Brown & Ray Henderson 
 Minnie, the Moocher--The Ho De 'Ho Song Cab Calloway & Irving Mills 
 Mood Indigo Duke Ellington, Irving Mills & Albany Bigard 
 Out of Nowhere Edward Heyman; John W. Green 
1932 It Don't Mean a Thing Irving Mills; Duke Ellington 
 Night and Day  Cole Porter 
 You're Getting to Be a Habit with Me Al Dubin; Harry Warren 
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APPENDIX B  
 
Compiled by Professor Jaxk Reeves and Kun Xu 
Statistics Department, University of Georgia 
 
 
I. DATA SET – THE POPULAR SONGS 
 
A. Description 
 
This set of data consists of 74 songs, composed in 1909-1932, which appeared at 
least 4 times in films during 1968-2007. The most popular songs ‘Star Dust’ and ‘La 
Cumparsita’ both appeared in film 17 times in our study period. Nineteen of these songs 
were published between 1909 and 1922. These 19 songs are all currently in the public 
domain, but were not necessarily in the public domain during the entire 40-year period of 
this investigation (1968-2007). The other 55 songs were published between 1923 and 
1932 are not yet in the public domain. This data set of 74 songs, where K>=4, is used for 
most of the analysis, but similarly analysis using thresholds if k>=3,k>=2, and k>=1 are 
also included. Table 1 below contains a sample of the data. 
 
 Table 1 POPULAR SONGS 
 
SONG COMPOSITION PUBYR EXP TOT T1968 T1969 T1970 … T2006 T2007 
1  By the light of the silvery … 1909  1984 4 0 0 0 ……  0 0
2  Let me call you sweetheart 1910  1985 4 0 0 0 ……  0 0
3  Alexander's Ragtime Band 1911  1986 5 0 0 0 ……  0 0
4  It's a long way to Tipperary 1912  1987 4 0 0 1 ……  0 0
5  El Choclo 1913  1988 6 1 0 0 ……  0 0
6 
… 
Danny Boy 
… 
1913 
… 
1988
… 
11
… 
0
… 
0
… 
0
… 
……  0
… 
0
… 
73  Night and Day  1932  2027 13 0 0 0 ……  2 0
74  You're Getting to Be a …  1932  2027 6 0 0 0 ……  0 0
total      537 4 4 5   20 3
 
 
Oringinal Variables: 
    SONG:       song number (for reference purpose) 
   COMPOSITION:    name of the song (for reference purpose) 
   PUBYR:      publication year 
   TOT:      total appearance time (in film) for that song during 1968-2007 
   T1968:   appears once for that song (in movie) in year 1968 
   T2007: appears once for that song (in movie) in year 2007 
   EXP: copyright expire time. (where PUBYR ≤ 1922, EXP=PUBYR+75;  
 and PUBYR>1922, EXP=PUBYR+95)   
 
The last row represents the total appearance of the songs in our list for a certain year 
during1968-2007. This ranges from a low of 2 in 1971 to a high of 41 in 1998. 
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B. Data Manipulation 
 
As stated in the introduction, the first analysis of the popular songs concerns 
“availability” of songs during 1968-2007. Each song was measured at every year from 
1968-2007, a total of 40 time points. The 40 variables T1968, T1969, …, T2007 from the 
original data were converted into one variable called AFPUB, with the values for AFPUB 
being 59,60,…,98 respectively. The modified data set should have 74 x 40=2960 
observations. This modified data set is called the song-year version of the popular songs. 
Three other variables, YR, MOV, and PD, were also created from the original data set of 
N=74 songs and carried over to the new data set of 2960 song-year events. A sample of 
the modified data is shown in Table 2 below: 
 
          Table 2 POPULAR SONGS (SONG-YEAR) 
 
OBS SONG PUBYR YR AFPUB PD MOV 
1 1 1909 1968 59 0 0 
2 1 1909 1969 60 0 0 
3 1 1909 1970 61 0 0 
4 1 1909 1971 62 0 0 
…… … … … … … … 
409 11 1916 1976 60 0 1 
…… … … … … … … 
751 19 1922 1998 76 1 0 
…… … … … … … … 
2956 74 1932 2006 74 0 0 
2960 74 1932 2007 75 0 0 
 
Generated Variables: 
OBS:     observation number  
SONG:    song number (same as in the Table 1.) 
PUBYR:   publication year of the song (same as in the Table 1.) 
AFPUB:   number of years after publication (as explained above) 
YR:       calendar year of measurement (= PUBYR+AFPUB)  
MOV:     indicator of the appearance of the song (1-appear in that year ; 0-not) 
PD:     indicator of the copyright (1 - in the public domain;0 - not in public domain.     
        
Observations where PUBYR ≤ 1922 and AFPUB ≥ 75 are in the public domain.) 
 
 
II. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULT 
 
Before presenting analysis results, it is necessary to briefly describe the tools and 
methodology used in the following analyses. Each of the 4 analyses took the same 
general path. First, the data were explored by numerical and graphical summaries. Then, 
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more sophisticated analyses followed. Since the response variable in this problem is 
dichotomous, logistic regression was applied. 
 
A. Exploratory Data Analysis 
 
1. Preliminary Analysis. As shown in Table 1, the appearance time of each 
popular song varies from 4-17 and the total number of appearances is 537(shown in the 
last row of Table 1 as variable TOT). In Figure 1, the histogram shows the frequency of 
songs appearances. Because no song appears exactly 15 or16 times in the data set, these 
two columns don’t show in the chart. The average appearance for each song is about 7 
times.  
 
Figure 1. Popular Songs by Number of Appearance (n=74) 
 
 
 
Through data manipulation, the appearance of a single song in particular year becomes a 
dichotomous variable (MOV),(0 if the song didn’t appear and 1 if it appeared in that 
year’s movie).Because there were 64 occasions where the some song appeared in more 
than one film during some year the total number of events in the dichotomous data set 
was reduced from 537 to 473 unique events. According to Table 2, of the 2960 
observations, only 312 are in the public domain and the rest are copyrighted. The 
percentage of these two groups are shown in Figure 2 below. The copyrighted 
observations are the majority with percentage 89.46%. 
 
Figure 2. Observations by Copyright Status 
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Furthermore, consider the total appearance in one year (shown in figure 3 below). By 
focusing on the total appearances, illustrated by the green line, one can see an increase 
after year 1984 when the songs published in 1909 came to the public domain. The total 
appearance also shows a sharp decrease after 1998 when the songs in our study stopped 
entering the public domain. At the same time, appearance of copyrighted songs, 
illustrated by red line (during the year 1968-1987, the red line overlaps with the green 
line), shows a steady increase through the whole time period. Contributions from the 
songs in public domain give a linear increase in appearance time after 1984.  
 
Figure.3 Song Appearances by Year and Status 
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Figure.4 Appearance Probability by Year and Status (K>=4) 
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On the other hand, the total number of observations for songs in public-domain and 
copyrighted are not equal. As shown in Figure 2, the proportion of appearance may be 
more appropriate to illustrate the effect of copyright effect. Divide the number of 
appearance time in any year by the total number of that set for both public-domain and 
copyrighted song observations. As shown in the Figure 4, we can see a slight difference 
between the copyright statuses. From all above, we can propose a null hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference in occurrence probability between the public domain 
songs and copyrighted songs, also an alternative hypothesis that the songs in public 
domain are more likely to be used in film. To decide which hypothesis is more probable 
we must perform further analysis.  
 
According to Figure 3 and Figure 4, we also notice that the value in year 2007 has an 
abnormally sharp decrease. We also do the same preliminary analysis on the popular 
songs that appear more than 1, 2 and 3 times , those graphs show abnormally sharp 
decrease in year 2007 as well. It is reasonable to consider the year 2007 as an outlier in 
this study, (which may be caused by incomplete data), so we don’t include observations 
in 2007 in our further analysis. In year 2007, no public domain song appeared in the film 
and the copyrighted songs appeared only 3 times. After deleting this year for all 74 songs 
in 2007, we have a total of 470 appearance including 75 public domain songs and 395 
copyrighted songs. The total observation number for all years combined decreases to 
74*39= 2886. 
 
2. Popular Songs Analysis 1 (Availability by Song-Year). Results of song-year 
analysis of the popular songs are presented in this section. The frequency table of 
availability (‘MOV’ rows) versus copyright status (‘PD’,columns) is shown below:  
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TABLE 3. MOV*PD FREQUENCY TABLE 
 
Frequency         
Col Percent     
Public 
Domain 
Copyrighted 
 
Total 
Appear 
 
75 
24.04% 
395 
15.35% 
470 
16.29% 
Not appear 237 
75.96% 
2179 
84.65% 
2416 
83.71% 
Total 312 2574 2886 
=74*39 
 
 
Results from Table 3 show that over the period of analysis, 15.35 % of copyrighted songs 
appeared versus 24.04 % of the public domain. Assuming each determination of 
availability is independent from others (which is not quite true here), the frequencies 
shown above imply that there exists an association between the rows and columns. But is 
the association statistically significant? The chi-square test for independence of rows and 
columns follows:  
 
 
                      
                     = 0.2715+ 2.2403 +1.3959+ 11.5166 =15.4242 
 
     
 
 
The p-value from the chi-square test indicates severe dependency between copyright 
status and appearance of songs in the movie. The Fisher exact test for positive association 
(upper-tail test for large sample) follows:  
 
 
 
Where c = sum of the first column = 312; r = sum of the first row = 470; N= grand sum = 2886 
;  75 
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The p-value from the Fisher exact test shows that songs in the public domain were used 
by movie maker at a significantly higher rate than those which were copyrighted. The 
above result is based on the assumption that all observations are independent from others. 
It was used to determine if there exists an association to warrant further analyses. Since a 
strong dependency exists between copyright status and works’ appearance, we proceed 
with further analysis. Of course, the results above are exaggerated to some extent because 
each song appeared, on average, about 6 times in the above analysis, and the availability 
status for a particular song is surely positively correlated over times. However, even 
under the most severe assumption (that observations for a particular book are completely 
correlated, so that the sample size is exaggerated by a factor of 6), the 2χ  value obtained 
( ) would still lead to a very strong evidence of a public domain effect. 
 
3. Results for Other Thresholds. e results presented above and analyzed in the 
bulk of this report concern the dataset when restricted to the n=74 songs which had 
appeared in at least 4 films during the 39 years between 1968-2006. This restriction was 
made so as to include the songs which were clearly 'popular' over the period. On the other 
hand, this is a rather restrictive requirement, since it includes only 74 of the 1294 popular 
songs released from 1909-1932, with only 19 of these being current public domain songs. 
If the threshold for inclusion were lowered from K>=4 to K>=3, K>=2, or K>=1, many 
more songs could be included, but the reliability of results might decrease. Table 4 below 
contains summaries of the data which would occur if one used other inclusion thresholds. 
The remainder of this report will concentrate on the K>=4 case described in the first row 
of Table 4, and discussed heretofore, but results for the other 3 data sets will be presented 
at the end of the report. 
 
 
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF DATA SETS BASED ON INCLUSION 
THRESHOLD(K) 
 
  
 K 
Songs 
N   EPD   CP 
All   Events 
Ev   UEv  ESY    P 
PD Events 
UEv   ESY   P 
CP Events 
UEv  ESY   P 
>=4 74    19    55 537   470   2886   
0.1629 
75     312   0.2404 395  2574 
0.1535 
>=3 99    23    76 612   540   3861  
0.1399 
76     341   0.2229 464  3520 
0.1318 
>=2 146   40   106 706   633   5694  
0.1112 
91     552   0.1649 542  5142 
0.1054 
>=1 259   79   180 819   746   10101 
0.0739 
113    1058 
0.1068 
633  9043 
0.0700 
 
The 'Songs' section of Table 4 categorizes the 'N' songs that meet the threshold 
requirement into those that have entered the public domain (EPD) and those that are still 
copyright protected (CP). It should be remembered, of course, that the 'EPD' songs were 
not 'PD' for the entire period of observation. The next section of the table (All Events) 
counts the total number of times that a song is used in a film in the 39-year period from 
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1968-2006. This number of events (Ev) is reduced slightly to unique events, (UEv), since 
we allow a song to be counted at most once in a given year. Eligible song-years (ESY) is 
given by ESY=N*39, since each song is eligible to be in a film for each of the 39 years. 
The last column of this section, P, where P=UEv/ESY, is the proportion of songs used in 
films. The last two sections, 'PD Events' and 'CP Events', simply subdivide all song-years 
and associated events into those which occurred under 'PD' and those which occurred 
under 'CP' conditions. For all 4 threshold conditions, it can be noted that 'P' is higher 
under the PD conditions than under the CP conditions. One can easily perform Chi-
squared tests (as was done above in Section III.1.b for the K>=4 dataset) to show that the 
differences are significant. One objection to these tests could be that they do not account 
for time effects - the 'PD' group has a higher proportion of its songs eligible during the 
latter years of the observation period than does the 'CP' group. So, if there is an increase 
in utilization rate over time due to factors unrelated to copyright status, the Chi-squared 
tests could overstate the importance of the copyright status effect. To investigate this, in 
the next section of this report, Logistic Regression models which can control for both 
copyright status and time (year) are introduced.  
 
B. Logistic Regression 
 
In analysis 1 (song-year level) of the popular songs, the response variable (MOV) 
is dichotomous (0 if the song didn’t appear, and 1 if it appeared in that year’s movie). 
Logistic regression is appropriate for modeling this type of response variable.  
 
Using copyright status (PD) alone to model availability (MOV) might omit other 
significant factors affecting songs appearance in films. Other variables which could be 
included in the model are PUBYR, AFPUB, and YR. All four variables (PD, PUBYR, 
AFPUB, and YR) are possible explanatory variables for CPUB. Since copyright status is 
the explanatory variable of primary interest, it was the first variable included in the 
model. Care needs to be taken when choosing additional variables to include in the model 
to avoid confounding effects since some of these variables are function of others. For 
example, copyright status (PD) depends solely on publication year (PUBYR) and age of 
the work (AFPUB), and the calendar year of the measurement (YR) is the sum of 
publication year (PUBYR) and age of the work (AFPUB). According to our data, the year 
1984 is a key point to the observation, because the songs in our study start to fall in 
public-domain in that year. We make a new variable PY84, defined as PY84=YR-1984, 
Since period is another effect of interest and PY84 was not too highly correlated with PD, 
it was included in the model (Figure 3 shows a increase in total appearance after year 
1984). Including either PUBYR or AFPUB in this model (along with PD and PY84) will 
cause some confounding, so we did not attempt this. 
 
Of course, just because appearance is more likely for PD than CP events, doesn't prove 
that PD is significantly different higher than CP. The main confounder is year, since there 
were many more PD eligible during later years, and there seems to be a strong year 
effect. To investigatethis, we considered a 7-level hierarchy of linear models: 
 
 
ln(P/Q) = B0                 [Model 0} 
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ln(P/Q) = B0 + B1*PD             [Model 1] {PD only} 
ln(P/Q) = B0 +    + B2*PY84        [Model 1L] Linear in PY84 
ln(P/Q) = B0 +    + a(grp)        [Model 1G] grouped year 
ln(P/Q) = B0 + B1*PD + B2*PY84        [Model 2L] {Linear,Additive} 
ln(P/Q) = B0 + B1*PD + a(grp)        [Model 2G] {grouped,Additive} 
ln(P/Q) = B0 + B1*PD + B2*PY84 + B3*PD*PY84 [Model 3L] 
{Linear,Interaction} 
 
In fact, Models IL and 1G are similar in all cases, since the trend is close to linear. (The 
grouped method uses 5 blocks of 8 years, but similar results were found with 10 blocks of 
4.) The real question concerns whether the B1 coefficient in model 2L (or 2G) is 
significantly different from zero, or whether it can be thrown out, reducing to Model 1L 
(or 1G). It turns out that in every case, the answer is 'not significant'; there is no effect of 
PD/CP on appearance, once one controls for year effect. The fit for selected models for 
K>=4 is shown in the Table below. 
 
TABLE 5.  Summary of 7 Hierarchical models for (K>= 4) Dataset 
 
Model   B0    B1    B2    B3  -2lnL  AIC  SBC 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 0   -1.6371   .    .    .   2565 2567 2573 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 1   -1.7077 +0.5571   .    .   2551 2555 2567 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 1L  -1.9642  .   +0.0598   .   2405 2409 2421* 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 1G  -1.7840  .    [GRP 5]  .   2398 2408* 2437 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 2L  -1.9602 -0.0534 +0.0603   .   2405 2411 2429    
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 2G  -1.7708 -0.0530  [GRP 5]  .   2398 2410 2446 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 3L  -1.9704 +0.4635 +0.0618 -0.0365  2403 2411 2435 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Based on the AIC or BIC we can either pick the model with continuous year effect or the 
grouped year effect as our final model. Both of the models have the same interpretation 
of the data, which is that the probability of the songs appearing in the film increase over 
time, but there is no effect due to PD/CP.  
 
We also do the same analysis on other threshold and the result shows the same trend on 
the data set. The crucial results come from the analyses of Model 2L for each data set. In 
each case, the P-value for the ‘PD’ effect (‘B1’ in the model) is not statistically 
significantly different from zero, as shown in Table 6 below. Thus, after accounting for 
the increase in appearance rates over time, there is no evidence of a positive or negative 
effect on appearance probability due to being in public domain or not. This holds for all 4 
data sets. 
 
Table 6. Parameter Estimates of B1 for 2L Models  
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                                   2-tailed 
DataSet    B1-estimate SE(B1)  z-stat  P-value 
K>=4       -0.0534    .1504   -0.355 .7241 
K>=3      +0.0328    .1505  +0.218 .8277 
K>=2      -0.0854     .1304  -0.655  .5120 
K>=1      -0.1171     .1145  -1.022  .3067 
 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A naïve analysis of the data (the chi-squared & fisher’s test of section IV. 1) 
demonstrated a clear difference in availability of books between copyrighted and public 
domain works, with public domain works being significantly more appearance in film. A 
serious objection to this analysis is that it controlled for neither period effects nor for 
popularity of books considered. After the logistic regression analysis to control for time-
period effects, we find that the copyright status plays no significant role in affecting the 
probability of a song’s appearance in a film. 
 42
APPENDIX C 
 
 
Title Author 
Pub 
Yr 60 65 70 75/PD 80/PD 85/PD 2006 status 
Pollyanna Porter, Eleanor 1913 0 0 0 5 4 10 30 print/5 ebooks 
O Pioneers! Cather, Willa 1913 2 1 0 3 8 13 38 print/5 ebooks 
Sons and Lovers Lawrence, D.H. 1913 3 5 5 7 10 14 24 print/7 ebooks 
Dubliners Joyce, James 1914 2 2 4 2 10 11 24 print/5 ebooks 
Tarzan of the Apes Burroughs, Edgar 1914 2 2 3 3 5 10 39 print/6 ebooks 
Of Human Bondage Maugham, Somerset 1915 6 5 5 3 6 11 18 print/3 ebooks 
The Song of the Lark Cather, Willa 1915 1 1 2 3 5 10 17 print/2 ebooks 
The Lone Star Ranger Grey, Zane 1915 0 1 2 2 4 4 18 print/4 ebooks 
A Portrait of the Artist Joyce, James 1916 3 3 6 4 12 15 34 print/4 ebooks 
The Magnificent Ambersons Tarkington, Booth 1918 3 1 3 2 3 7 18 
My Antonia Cather, Willa 1918 2 1 4 4 18 42 50 print/3 ebooks 
Winesburg, Ohio Anderson, Sherwood 1919 2 1 2 6 12 26 29 print/5 ebooks 
This Side of Paradise Fitzgerald, F. Scott 1920 2 1 3 6 12 23 24 print/6 ebooks 
Main Street Lewis, Sinclair 1920 2 3 3 8 11 27 27 print/6 ebooks 
The Age of Innocence Wharton, Edith 1920 1 2 3 12 15 35 35 print/7 ebooks 
Scaramouche Sabatini, Raphael 1921 0 1 1 5 3 18 18 
Babbit Lewis, Sinclair 1922 2 3 4 10 12  30 print/7 ebooks 
The Beautiful and the Damned Fitzgerald, F. Scott 1922 1 2 2 2 11  18 
Captain Blood Sabatini, Raphael 1922 0 0 0 2 8  22 
Ulysses Joyce, James 1922 4 5 6 8   19 print/3 ebooks 
Totals for 20 books   38 40 58 93 181 268 
532 print/97 
ebooks 
Ave. Publ/Ed Per Print Book   1.9 2 2.9 4.7 9 13.4 26.6 
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